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Reason and revolt
Guy Lardreau’s early voluntarism and its limits
Peter Hallward
Guy Lardreau has few rivals for the honour of being 
the most under-appreciated contemporary French 
philosopher.1 A student of Louis Althusser at the 
École Normale in the late 1960s and a flamboy-
ant figure in Maoist intellectual circles before and 
after 1968, he remains best known for his searing 
reflections on cultural revolution and its ideological 
recuperation in the sensational book he co-authored 
with Christian Jambet, L’Ange (1976).2 Although he 
published on an unusually eclectic range of topics 
– his bibliography includes books on science fiction, 
Philoxenus of Mabbug, human rights, Deleuze, crime 
fiction, post-Kantian ontology, materialism, a dia-
logue on medieval history – the simplest way to 
present his work is as a consistent engagement with 
one of the central questions pondered by Rousseau, 
Kant and the German Idealists, a question that was 
then taken up by Marx and by what Lardreau will 
call the successive ‘stages’ of Marxism. This is the 
old question regarding the relation between necessity 
and freedom: how might a passage from one to the 
other be conceived as itself free – that is, as freely 
or voluntarily undertaken – rather than as imposed 
by natural or economic necessity, or as orchestrated 
by the ‘cunning of history’? To evoke the formula-
tion that concludes L’Ange, to what extent might the 
‘autonomy of revolt’ be attributed a transcendental 
status (LA, 233)? And more concretely, if the Leninist 
and Stalinist stages of Marxism remain conditioned 
by a purportedly inexorable logic of history, is there a 
form of self-emancipation that might resist dialecti-
cal conversion into its opposite?
The specific version of this question that came 
to haunt Lardreau for much of his life concerns the 
quality of the volition at stake in such emancipation. 
‘How can something undertaken in order to make 
things better’, he asks in a late essay, ‘eventually take 
a turn for the worse – and this not because the will 
behind this undertaking became lazy or forgetful, 
but on account of this will itself?’3 What must we 
understand about the will to initiate radical change, 
if we are to avoid this turn for the worse which so 
often overcame modern political projects? Why did 
the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions culmi-
nate in ‘disastrous and criminal failure’? What was 
it about these and related attempts to ‘bend political 
power to the highest ends of reason’ – the ends of 
freedom and equality, of a world without oppres-
sion – that doomed them to ‘result in the necessary 
reversal of best into worst’?4 Why does Terror, in the 
Jacobin sense, appear as an ineluctable corollary to 
the voluntary pursuit of happiness and virtue?5 
What is it about the exercise of a specifically 
political will, in short, that appears to involve a literal 
contradiction in terms, and to condemn any project 
of deliberate and forceful collective self-emancipation 
to eventual collusion in mass crime?
Although this question only takes shape in 
Lardreau’s work during the latter half of the 1970s 
(from which point it persists right through to his 
posthumously published text Faces de l’ange déchu), I 
hope to show here that its initial formulation can be 
traced to his first and most passionately argued work 
of philosophy, Le Singe d’or (The Golden Monkey, 1973). 
Although often dismissed as youthful extravagance, 
this book is not only Lardreau’s most important con-
tribution to radical politics; its central concerns also 
orient much of his subsequent philosophical trajec-
tory. Quickly recognized as the most significant theo-
retical text to emerge from the Gauche Prolétarienne 
(GP) current of French Maoism in the early 1970s,6 Le 
Singe d’or offers perhaps the most uncompromising 
affirmation of revolutionary political will to be pub-
lished in France since Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the 
Earth (1961). The best way to understand the subse-
quent movement of Lardreau’s thought, furthermore, 
from the combination of defiant elation and ascetic 
withdrawal characteristic of L’Ange (1976) and the 
follow-up Discours philosophique et discours spirituel 
(1985) to the neo-Kantian ‘legalism’ of Le Monde (1978) 
and La Véracité (1993) is as an effort to salvage a 
version of his early voluntarism while avoiding the 
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apparent impasse of its initial articulation. In the 
process, Lardreau found himself obliged to reorient 
his understanding of the will from the domains of 
history and politics to those of morality and religion, 
such that what he gains by way of principled integrity 
he loses in terms of political actuality. At each stage 
in this trajectory, Rousseau remains a privileged 
interlocutor, though for very different reasons – first 
as the critic of scientific ‘progress’ and the proto-
Maoist prophet of an egalitarian general will, and 
later as the introspective hermit who withdraws from 
the corrupting machinations of the public sphere.
Despite the undeniable complexity of its articula-
tion, I think it is possible to summarize the essential 
twist in Lardreau’s trajectory in a single sentence: 
whereas his early work connects the will with 
the positive actuality of its realization (following 
Rousseau and Hegel), his later work severs this link in 
order to posit a fully negative conception of practical 
philosophy (following Kant). What persists across 
this trajectory is a ringing affirmation of revolt over 
submission, of freedom over necessity, of autonomy 
over any sort of alignment with or adaptation to an 
allegedly irresistible logic of economic development 
or historical evolution; what changes is the status 
of this rebellious freedom, its withdrawal from the 
domain of social reality in favour of a ‘real’ but strictly 
‘unrealizable’ dimension of absolute prescription. 
What Lardreau thus shares with the two other 
great post-Maoist philosophers of his day, Jacques 
Rancière and Alain Badiou, is an adherence to the 
logic of an interrupted or deflected fidelity to the 
ideals of May ’68 and the Cultural Revolution. Unlike 
so many of their contemporaries, all three remain 
committed to the principles of equality, justice and 
the validity of popular revolt, but they found strik-
ingly different ways of upholding them. Through 
his contributions to Révoltes Logiques in the mid- 
and late 1970s, Rancière responded to the crisis of 
French Maoism by shifting his historical focus, by 
turning back to those moments of the nineteenth 
century when popular protagonists might be more 
easily identified with the role of insurgents against 
top-down authority and mandarin disdain. From 
the early 1980s, Badiou began to preserve his fidel-
ity to Maoism by detaching instances of egalitar-
ian revolt from the broader movement of history 
altogether – that is, by configuring them in terms of 
the consequential logic of an unpredictable event. 
Lardreau’s strategy came to involve a retreat from 
both historical reality and political temporality tout 
court. 
All of Lardreau’s work can be read as an attempt to 
rid philosophy of what he sees as its ‘principal enemy’ 
– ‘the plague of Stoicism’, and the myriad versions 
of passivity and spiritualist resignation (through to 
Spinoza, Bergson and Deleuze) that he associates 
with it.7 Over time, however, Lardreau’s commit-
ment to an insurgent freedom becomes both more 
radical and more abstract. The more unconditional 
the affirmation that sustains it, the more distant it 
becomes from the conditions that might enable its 
implementation. The more Lardreau contemplates 
freedom, the less he becomes a partisan of actual 
emancipation.
I
Although Le Singe d’or is not an easy book to read 
its argument is easily distilled.8 Everything turns 
on the inaugural assertion of Mao’s Great Proletar-
ian Cultural Revolution, endowed here with all the 
authority (and limits) of a revelation: on a raison de 
se révolter.9 Although automatically condemned by 
the guardians of the established order as wrong, it is 
always right for the people to rise in revolt.10 Revolt 
is ‘the highest form of life’. Debate regarding the 
status of Marxism itself remains worthwhile only 
in so far as it affirms ‘the people’s revolt because it 
is necessary, and necessarily right and just’ (SO, 24). 
Revolt and reason thus figure as opposite sides of one 
and the same coin, and the only self-evident certainty 
Lardreau is prepared to recognize here is that ‘people 
do not tolerate oppression’.11
If it ‘cannot be wrong to revolt’ (SO, 100), if reason 
is itself revolt, then at least four consequences would 
seem to follow as a matter of course.
First of all, negatively, there is then no ‘reason’ for 
things simply to be the way they are, or the way they 
have been, let alone to be the way they have always 
been. 
If thus far there has always been oppression and 
injustice, and if up to the present moment our world 
has always been structured in dominance, that is no 
reason for assuming that a world without oppression 
or domination is impossible (SO, 228–9; LA, 153). 
Here we have a radical version of Hume’s thesis, so 
to speak, in a sense not so far removed from that 
recently proposed by Quentin Meillassoux:12 from 
what has been hitherto, no automatic inferences can 
be drawn regarding what is likely to be in the future, 
or what should be in the present. 
If reason is a matter of active revolt rather than of 
abstract logic or immanent necessity, furthermore, 
then there is an essential difference in principle 
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between emancipatory struggle against every form 
of oppression, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
an apparent mandate for mere class supremacy as 
dictated by the apparent logic of economic develop-
ment. Reconstruction of the latter, even if designed to 
vindicate the ‘inevitable’ triumph of the proletariat, 
is perfectly compatible with an orderly succession of 
socio-economic modes or configurations, an inexora-
ble sequence in which ‘everything is in its proper place’ 
(SO, 126). Lardreau vigorously rejects, therefore, every 
version of the orthodox Marxist or Leninist argument 
that capitalism, and the full development of capitalist 
contradictions, is itself, for the oppressed themselves, 
the experience of any sort of fulfilment or necessity. 
Lardreau rejects in particular Lenin’s quasi-Taylorist 
argument that the capitalist factory system provides 
a much needed form of socio-economic training and 
discipline, such that capitalism itself might come to 
figure as the ‘educator’ of the oppressed, as if capital-
ism alone might ‘instruct them, lend them power and 
will, and teach them to struggle against oppression’ 
(SO, 99). The Luddites were right to revolt against the 
imposition of the factory system for the same reason 
that subsequent generations of workers were right 
to reject the logic of wage labour: at each successive 
phase of its exercise, revolt has its own reasons and 
its own capacity for renewal; it is not derivative of any 
deeper determination or of any more material cause 
(SO, 102). As a rule, genuine or cultural revolution 
‘has no other “material base” than oppression as such, 
and the mechanism of its causality consists entirely 
in the logic whereby “where there is oppression, there 
is resistance”’ (LA, 92).
Hence a third and more obviously proto-Kantian 
consequence of our equation of reason and revolt: it 
applies only in practice, rather than in theory. The 
exercise of reason is not a matter of abstract logic 
or of natural, transhistorical norms, but rather of 
a capacity (Vermögen) or readiness to revolt. In each 
case, the decision depends on a neo-Nietzschean 
exercise in political psychology, a test or trial which 
turns on the question, in the domain of politics as 
much as that of sexuality: ‘do you feel strong enough 
to break the history of the world in two?’ (SO, 229; 
cf. 127). Do you accept that there is a reason for the 
organization of our lives – our bodies, our families, 
our societies – to be and to remain the way they are? 
Or are you willing to do what it takes to remake 
them? Such a ‘psycho-political’ approach to the ques-
tion of revolt further orients Lardreau’s answer to a 
related question, the question of the actor or agent 
of revolt, the question that might be posed, again in 
neo-Nietzschean terms, as ‘the one who revolts’, the 
one who wills revolt rather than reaction or stabil-
ity. Compared with more orthodox readers of Marx, 
let alone Lenin, Lardreau is remarkably insouciant 
about questions of class and class composition. If 
it is the masses, the people, the oppressed or ‘the 
wretched [les gueux]’ who make history, it is because 
these actors revolt against privilege and oppression. 
The action would seem to induce the actor. What 
validates Marxism, during each of the active ‘stages’ 
of its development, is simply the fact that it grounds 
itself in the ongoing ‘revolt of the people’, understood 
as a process en acte (SO, 24).
A fourth consequence of the equation of reason 
and revolt is that it allows us to distinguish between 
two very different kinds of historical rationality; 
that is, for the affirmation of a historical rationality 
irreducible to any science of history (any attribution of 
an immanent progress to history). In Singe Lardreau 
appeals without apology to Hegel’s authority on this 
point, in order to affirm against Kant his ‘central 
thesis …: there is only history, or again: things don’t 
exist’, other than as fragile, evanescent coagulations 
of historical forces (SO, 187). Everything is historical, 
however, only to the extent that history might itself 
be understood simply as the temporal dimension of 
revolt (and thus as the actuality of reason), rather than 
as any sort of orderly progression or immanent teleol-
ogy. ‘If then I refuse any idea of meaning or direction 
[sens], as a form of progress or regress’, Lardreau 
explained a year after Singe was published, ‘I never-
theless maintain that there is a single signification of 
History; or again, that histories [in the plural], as his-
tories of the singular, scattered histories, are ordered 
by a single motor: the struggle against oppression.’13 
History does not figure as an extra-subjective dimen-
sion that might determine the actions of those actors 
empowered to ‘make’ it, and proletarian revolution as 
Lardreau understands it does not promise to build on 
the past achievements and historical heritage of the 
bourgeoisie. ‘The ideology of progress [is] the origin 
of all that is most reactionary in Marxism.’14
II
Attribution of historical rationality to emancipa-
tory revolt rather than to order or necessity further 
orients the main polemical thrust of Le Singe d’or 
– namely, a full-on attack on the authority of science 
and its appeal to neutral or eternal ‘truth’, an attack 
that makes Jacques Rancière’s celebrated critique 
of Althusser’s scientism (published a year after 
Singe) look mild by comparison.15 Science separates 
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contemplative over productive life, and privileges the 
dispassionate insights of the former over the practical 
urgency of the latter. Science as such is an integral 
part of the ‘world of oppression’, Lardreau argues, 
and ‘all science is science against the people. Far from 
learning from them, we should despise scholars [les 
savants]’ (SO, 89). Equally despicable is any conception 
of the proletariat conceived in terms of the incarna-
tion of science or the ‘realization [Verwirklichung] of 
philosophy’;16 that is, any conception of a revolution-
ary actor grounded not in the revolt it freely and 
knowingly undertakes but in the underlying neces-
sity, authority or order it is supposed to represent. If 
the proletariat merely comes to figure as the ‘class 
whose interests fuse in advance with the maximum 
development of the productive forces’, then it simply 
‘represents the party of science’ (SO, 60) and to that 
extent it figures as a bulwark against revolutionary 
disruption, rather than the reverse. 
To recover the rebellious spirit and purpose of 
Marxism is thus to reverse the process that converted 
it into a science, the process that began with Marx’s 
economic writings and that soon became systematic 
with the Second International, thanks especially to 
Kautsky, Lenin and then Stalin. The concern of such 
scientific socialism is less the justice of voluntary 
insurrection than an adequate understanding of 
the causal forces that appear to ‘necessitate’ such 
revolt and to lend the imminent self-destruction of 
capitalism, in Marx’s fateful phrase, ‘the inexorabil-
ity of a natural process’.17 The preliminary to any 
would-be scientific approach to political activity is 
thus a refusal to see it as active, precisely; that is, a 
refusal to treat it in terms of ‘freedom, the will of 
human beings, in brief, as political action’ (SO, 84 
n1). Instead, what is determinant is the more or less 
inevitable unfolding of successive modes of produc-
tion, such that each new mode emerges smoothly 
from the one that begot it, in keeping with the quasi-
obstetric sequence of unfolding that Lardreau dubs 
la Gigogne, for short (SO, 84 and passim). Adapted 
from a version of Hegel’s negation of the negation, 
the ‘birth’ of a new mode, as the Marxian metaphor 
suggests, is an essentially natural process that oper-
ates independently of the will of the actors involved, 
in keeping with its scientifically verified telos, the 
development of the forces of production. Marxism 
is thereby reduced to the study of socio-economic 
necessity, until it figures as ‘a necessary discourse 
on necessity, guaranteed by Science’ (SO, 84). Stalin’s 
insistence on the iron laws of historical determina-
tion simply indicates that, ‘as usual, [he] was nothing 
more or less than a good reader of Marx and of 
Lenin’ (SO, 223 n.a).
Recovery of Marxism as a discourse of revolt 
further requires an appreciation of the historicity 
of this discourse itself; that is, an awareness of the 
way that the tension between its revolutionary or 
populist and reactionary or scientific aspects plays 
out as a process marked by specific steps or stages 
(a concern that justifies the subtitle of the book). 
‘There are stages [étapes] of Marxism because there 
are eras [époques] of history’, and history is organized 
in periods or eras because material conditions and 
working practices do not just gradually evolve but 
proceed by leaps and breaks, which after periods of 
struggle and confusion render those of the previous 
era obsolete (SO, 103). It doesn’t matter, Lardreau 
argues, whether from the perspective of a scientific 
observer the historical sequence of stages follows 
the logic of la Gigogne or not; what matters is that 
every act and discourse of revolt is of a piece with its 
moment – that is, its passing moment. The only time 
of revolt is the present, and it proceeds by breaking 
with the previous present. What persists, then, across 
each of these various stages, is simply the logic of 
ongoing revolt itself, and a new stage takes shape if it 
manages to find its own distinctive way to insist once 
again, for its own place and time, that on a raison de 
se révolter: this is the only ‘universal truth’ a Marxist 
should recognize (SO, 106).
That everything is historical thus means that what 
may affirm and strengthen revolt at one time may 
subsequently turn against it in another, and if (fol-
lowing Rousseau, Nietzsche and Foucault) Lardreau 
relies on genealogy as his means of critique it is 
because his chief targets are anachronism and ossifi-
cation. The Luddites made the most of one moment, 
the Communards another. Lenin himself deserves the 
greatest respect as a man of his time, as the leading 
figure of the second great stage of Marxism. In the 
wake of 1917, however, the consolidation of Leninism 
as a new orthodoxy was quickly appropriated by the 
reactionaries who come to dominate the new social 
order. Respect for Lenin as a revolutionary demands 
criticism of Leninism as a dogma (SO, 112), and today 
the remnants of an ossified Leninism are an obstacle 
to the current and living stage of Marxism, la pensée 
de révolte de notre temps – that is, Maoism. 
In the light of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in 
China and its affirmation in some other parts of the 
world, Mao’s thought no longer figures as a revision 
of Leninist Marxism, but as a properly new stage, 
a third stage in the Marxian affirmation of revolt, 
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unavoidably bound up in relations of struggle and 
contestation with partisans of the previous phase.18 
Mao’s insistence on immediate and unconditional 
equality, his confidence in the masses and their 
ability to ‘systematize’, his affirmation of popular 
experience and insight, his distrust of authorized 
knowledge, his critique of bureaucratization and of 
resurgent oligarchy and privilege within the Party, 
and so on, all serve to historicize and to solve the 
problems inherited from Leninism – and thereby 
to consign both these problems and their source 
to the past. Maoism doesn’t build on, improve or 
enrich an outmoded Leninism. As a rival account of 
revolt, grounded in the present era, it breaks with 
and replaces it (SO, 106 n1). In particular, the Maoist 
stage marks a full-on assault against the privileged 
figure of Leninist ‘science’, of the ‘professional revo-
lutionaries’ who positioned themselves as the ‘subject 
supposed to know’ (SO, 121). The priority now is 
simply to remove the obstacles that block or divide 
the consolidation of popular knowledge, itself the 
source of all political knowledge.
III
Across the old arguments that continue to pit 
freedom against necessity and the will against intel-
lect, few books have come down so forcefully on the 
side of an emancipatory voluntarism as Le Singe d’or. 
Lardreau’s insistence that everything is historical is 
itself derivative of the more fundamental principle 
that history is the result of what people have willed 
it to become, either through acquiescence in or revolt 
against the status quo. This applies to everything, in 
the sense that the domain of voluntary transforma-
tion is not merely one sphere among others, or one 
particular subsphere of a more universal one; and 
it applies to everything, or can be made to apply to 
everything, in so far as the sole ‘locomotive of history’ 
is popular revolt.
Lardreau’s book cannot avoid addressing, then, as 
its central dilemma, the question raised by virtually 
every great thinker in the post-Kantian (and of course 
post-Marxian) tradition: ‘how to reconcile freedom, 
the will of human beings … and economic necessity?’ 
(SO, 84 n1). Or again, in a more exuberant rhetorical 
key:
For us, everything depends on knowing whether 
the revolution is conceived in keeping with the 
necessity of a gigogne, which renders it similar to 
so many other sequences in the past, or whether, 
taking it seriously, and knowing that what is at 
stake in the revolution is to storm the heavens and 
take them by assault, to construct for the first time 
in history a society without oppression, a new hu-
manity, we feel strong enough to break the history 
of the world in two. (SO, 145)
Rejecting any economistic understanding of 
capitalist development as ‘the necessary machine of 
freedom’ (SO, 99), Lardreau insists that if it is to 
prevail and endure, the movement from imposed 
necessity to an assumed freedom must itself be freely 
undertaken. If, ‘outside of people, independently of 
their will, history unfolds through the endlessly 
renewed contradiction between the mode of produc-
tive and the productive forces’, then the domain of 
history is turned upside down: from the sphere of 
voluntary self-determination, or the ‘realization of 
freedom’, it is transformed into a quasi-mechanical 
process and ‘appears as implacable as nature itself ’ 
(SO, 84). By contrast, Lardreau’s insistence that 
‘history is the whole of the real’ only holds good to 
the extent that the ‘motor’ of this history is indeed 
the deliberate ‘struggle against oppression’, which 
proceeds in keeping with the further assumption that 
‘the masses know what they want or will [veulent], that 
they indeed desire what they desire’. The people will 
what they will, in the absence of any neo-Hegelian 
providence, any theodicy, any cunning of reason that 
might manipulate their desires or behaviour (SO, 188). 
Revolution is not the actualization of sub-voluntary 
reason, of a ‘real’ reason beneath the domain of lived 
experience and motivation, but is itself – in terms 
that already prepare the way for Lardreau’s subse-
quent turn to Kant’s moral philosophy – the exercise 
of reason in practice, one’s own reason expressed 
through a decisive will and sustained by desire and 
faith:
To will the revolution rests on a pure commitment 
[parti pris…], it is a pure wager, which appears thor-
oughly unreasonable, and which all the evidence 
appears to confound: although there has always 
been oppression, it is the wager that nevertheless 
it will not always be so, and that the millen-
nial struggle will one day be victorious. And this 
because, as with Pascal’s wager, there is on the one 
side everything to gain, and on the other nothing 
to lose. The revolution is a work of faith. Once we 
have banished necessity and truth, we can grasp 
the new meaning of that Kantian formula from 
which we set out: dare to think. This is no small 
audacity. (SO, 89)
Rather than scientific explanation and its ‘truth’, 
what underpins an understanding of the world is 
here the position we adopt with respect to the basic, 
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constitutive, transhistorical relation of oppression: 
for or against? If everything is historical, then the fate 
of a world hitherto structured in relations of domi-
nance and oppression depends not on the inevitable 
development of pseudo-natural causal mechanisms, 
but on the balance between insurgent and reaction-
ary forces. What is here determinant, in the first 
rather than last instance, is the power of a collective 
will to revolt against oppression, as inflected through 
its relation with the powers that oppose it.
Appreciation of the qualitative difference between 
an actually ‘general’ and a merely majoritarian will 
is one of the several reasons why Lardreau calls here 
for a ‘return to Rousseau’, and why Rousseau figures, 
alongside Mao, as Lardreau’s most important inter-
locutor in Le Singe d’or, indeed as a genuine kindred 
spirit (SO, 214). Lardreau doesn’t just embrace Rous-
seau’s critique of science, progress and his refusal of 
any natural or extra-historical basis for inequality 
and injustice (SO, 204, 235). From a Rousseauist per-
spective, what enables social change is not a develop-
mental logic that might orient and thus necessitate 
history from within, but the ‘simple’, willed process 
of transformative action itself. Change is first and 
foremost a matter of virtuous volition. Above all, 
then, Rousseau anticipates for Lardreau the popular-
voluntarist dimension of Maoist political practice 
(and, as he might have added, the practice affirmed 
by contemporaries like Fanon, Che and Castro). 
‘Only a politics of the general will, which refuses the 
disaggregation of the People into a mass of repre-
sented individuals …, can put an end to inequality.’19 
Where one exists, a general or popular will is the 
immediate incarnation of law-giving power, in its 
self-constituting capacity as a collective actor. On 
this score, Rousseau breaks with the whole early-
modern, natural-law account of the state that posited 
sovereignty as in principle distinct from the persona 
(be it monarch or people) who might best ‘represent’ 
it or act on its behalf. The Rousseauist or Jacobin 
alternative is to affirm the collective actor per se 
as sovereign: the people constitute themselves as 
sovereign not because they are best placed to act 
‘like’ a sovereign power but because their collective 
capacity for political action and social transforma-
tion itself directly invests them with such power. 
Following Rousseau’s lead, the only way to resolve the 
vexed relation between the people and their govern-
ment, or between the masses and the party, is to 
‘treat the Party, its theory and its programme, as the 
pure creation of the masses, animated by no other 
life than the one they breathe into it’. The goal is 
thereby to reduce ‘entirely the person of the state to 
the People themselves – and, more precisely, to the 
People in arms. Here again … it’s Rousseau to whom 
we should return, Rousseau who sought to think, 
properly, the sovereign People and not the sovereignty 
of the People.’20
This point goes to the heart of Lardreau’s early 
Rousseauism. What is essential is the constitution 
of the people as an actor that can indeed impose its 
sovereign and insurgent will, that has the capacity to 
revolt against injustice, and not the constitution of 
an orderly state that might then include the people 
as one of its legitimate components. The crux of 
Rousseau’s political voluntarism is his conjunction of 
the will with such autonomous capacity, the capacity 
to realize a consciously chosen end or purpose, free 
from coercion or submission to another’s will.21 ‘The 
truly free man’, as Rousseau puts it in Émile, ‘wills 
only what he can do, and does what pleases him [ne 
veut que ce qu’il peut, et fait ce qu’il lui plaît].’ Such is 
Rousseau’s ‘fundamental maxim’,22 which he affirms 
in keeping with his most basic ‘article of faith’: ‘there 
is no true action without will.’23 Vouloir and pouvoir 
must be thought and practised the one through 
the other. Versions of this conjunction of will and 
capacity recur across the revolutionary-voluntarist 
tradition that Rousseau helped to inspire, every time 
a figure like Trotsky, Gramsci or Che comes to rec-
ognize that ‘whoever genuinely wills an end must 
also will the means’, and that to will the means is to 
acquire the ability to make use of them.24 
IV
As Lardreau himself soon came to realize, however, 
the one-sided approach that Singe adopts with respect 
to history, science and truth simplifies and under-
mines its account of political action and popular 
revolt, and prepares the way for what is perhaps the 
most significant and far-reaching break in his phil-
osophy – the break between an account of the will. 
on the one hand, and its capacity for realization or 
actualization, on the other.
The more history is driven forward by the sole 
impetus of revolt, Lardreau recognizes, the more 
the present burns its bridges with the past. Every 
true revolutionary seeks liberation from historical 
memory.25 As the most revolutionary of the three 
stages of Marxism, Maoism is thus ‘infinitely’ more 
distant from Lenin than Lenin was from Marx – and 
for Lardreau, this confirms a sort of ‘law that ensures 
that the further Marxism moves away from the old 
world, and shakes it off, the more its metamorphoses 
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take the form of absolute repudiations’ (SO, 162). The 
more unconditionally one commits to revolt, the 
more ready one becomes to split the world’s history 
in two (cf. 229). At the limit, Lardreau speculates, 
what may survive such a break is an ‘amnesic human-
ity’, a humanity without historical memory, if not a 
humanity without libraries (SO, 127). But what then 
remains of ‘history’ itself, in the absence of historical 
memory? How might we think of distinct ‘eras’ or 
‘stages’ of history, complete with distinct modes of 
producing and distributing things, on the sole basis 
of revolt? 
Before it can help split the history of the world 
in two, Singe has to split the notion of history itself 
in two, between history as revolt on the one side 
and history as socio-economic change on the other. 
What is not resolved is the relation between these 
two dimensions, other than by tacitly subsuming the 
one under the other, by recasting the former as the 
animating spirit of the latter. As Hegel’s work dem-
onstrates with compelling force, however, any such 
conflation of freedom and necessity can only work, 
in the end, in the interest of necessity. Lardreau’s 
pointed though strained fidelity to Hegel’s historical 
‘optimism’ already indicates something of the price it 
will oblige him to pay. It is no easy trick to combine 
affirmation of revolt with an appreciation of that 
‘deep Hegelian optimism’ which recognizes that c’est 
bien ainsi. What is, is good, ‘for spirit never loses its 
way, and always does everything for the best … Even 
if the revolution comes to freeze up, spirit never gets 
lost’ (SO, 28). If Hegel’s Geist never goes astray, this 
is because it is itself the principle of the world it 
traverses. Hegel may frame his conception of politics 
around an account of the will, and arrange his con-
ception of history as the realization of freedom, but 
this realization is itself driven by its own immanent 
logic; once the will is considered not as a capacity 
to change something external to it but as an aspect 
of a single field of reality, then as far as any actual 
political actors are concerned they are free only to 
align themselves with the force of necessity (or to be 
discarded in the oblivion of contingency). The unity 
of freedom and necessity is ultimately consistent only 
with the ‘freedom’ of an absolute or God-like actor. 
The problem with Lardreau’s early voluntarism, 
in short, is that it is not sufficiently committed to 
an account of political will as a self-determining 
capacity in the broadly Rousseauist sense – that is, 
as an actual, historically determinate set of collec-
tive abilities, specific to the forms of association and 
struggle of their time. What Rousseau offers is an 
account of the process whereby a political will might 
generalize and consolidate its capacity to remake 
society, in line with collectively assumed principles 
of freedom and equality – and what Marx will add 
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is a more historically informed consideration of the 
way that human powers or capacities (Vermögen) take 
shape over historical time, how our capacity to work 
(Arbeits vermögen) is both enhanced and alienated, and 
how we might impose the political conditions that 
alone might liberate such capacities from command 
and coercion. Lardreau’s Singe, by contrast, pays little 
or no attention to such processes, and instead posits 
an already-generalized actor, with an already-absolute 
will: the people or ‘the masses’, whose historical being 
is exhausted by the exercise of permanent revolt. 
Lardreau rejects both the category of the individual 
(as a function of capitalist exchange and its represen-
tational state) and the historical process that might 
constitute a political class (a variant on bourgeois 
‘progress’); he is left with the abstract category of the 
masses, as the immediate incarnation of justice and 
revolt. In other words, he is left with an actor whose 
action is itself effectively automatic or involuntary, a 
political reflex. The masses invariably revolt against 
oppression, and this defines them.
In the end, Lardreau’s early work depends on ‘an 
act of faith in the thinking of the masses in revolt’ 
(SO, 89). So long as it is possible to maintain that ‘all 
intelligence comes from the masses’, that ‘the masses 
alone are capable of systematizing’, that ‘the masses 
are never mistaken’, that they always-already under-
stand their desire, that their will is expressed without 
any need for critical reflection or ‘scientific’ analysis 
(SO, 26, 122, 124), and so on, so then it might seem 
that Lardreau’s act of faith is a safe bet. It involves, 
admittedly, recognition of a difference between what 
the masses might currently think and want, in a 
world that oppresses them, and what they might 
think in so far as they rebel against its dominant 
ideology. Oppression affects the masses only as far 
as they can be led, temporarily, to ‘think outside 
themselves; their own thought, the thought of their 
oppression, encounters no constraint other than the 
external one of interdiction’, and remains ‘in no sense 
a thought of servitude, but a pure thought of revolt, a 
pure thought of history’.26 The difference is enough, 
however, to oblige Lardreau to recognize that ‘the 
thesis: all thought comes from the masses, is correct 
only if we understand: the revolutionary masses’, 
who may not always coincide with ‘the fundamental 
masses’ (SO, 26) or the people in general. But since 
the will of the masses is virtually revolutionary as 
a matter of course, Lardreau sees no need to linger 
over the old (and eminently Rousseauist) problem 
of the political ‘educator’. The masses need no tutor 
or législateur to usher them into the age of political 
reason, and still less do they need to internalize a 
knowledge that is formulated outside them, since 
they are already reason incarnate.
Of course, Lardreau’s investment in the untutored 
instincts of the masses is only presentable as a revo-
lutionary theory so long as the masses hold up their 
end of the bargain, and perform as expected. Pre-
cisely because Lardreau’s account of political will is 
coupled less to a capacity for realization (following 
Rousseau) than to historical realization or actuality 
itself (following Hegel), so then his position here 
commits him fully to the actuality of his own his-
torical moment – the seemingly victorious moment 
of the Cultural Revolution. What allows Lardreau 
to claim that the time has come to ‘relearn how to 
think’ is his confidence that ‘humanity is indeed 
in the process of escaping from the world of the 
oppression of man by man. Thought [la pensée] in 
its entirety is turning upside down. This is what is 
happening today in China. China is what is closest 
to us’ (SO, 72–3). As Lardreau would observe with 
retrospective clarity a couple of years after the dis-
solution of Gauche Prolétarienne, while it lasted its 
defining experience was ‘this absolute certainty that 
not only was revolution possible, but we were in the 
process of making it happen’, and that victory was 
only a matter of time.27 It was the actual triumph 
of new thinking in and from China, likewise, that 
underwrites Lardreau’s project to recover from the 
wreckage of Leninist scientism 
the pure spirit of revolt. It’s this spirit that we want 
to retrieve. And no doubt we want this simply 
because we can do this, because we no longer have 
that need, which Marx had, to lend the force of 
necessity to such a fragile hope; because although 
we are without certainty or truth we are neverthe-
less more confident [assurés] than him; because the 
thought of my time has not finished rejoicing in 
what the Cultural Revolution promises us. (SO, 88)
Jubilation, however, is indeed finite by definition. If 
Rousseau and Lenin are men of their moment, so 
too must be Mao and Lardreau themselves, and it is 
Lardreau’s historical misfortune to have arrived at 
this insight at more or less exactly the time when its 
moment expired. Just as the revolutionary enthusiasm 
of Singe is carried by the apparent zeal of the peuple 
en lutte, so too the chastened anti-revolutionary argu-
ment of Le Monde is ‘constrained’ by the need to 
take stock of the historical consequences of actually 
existing Maoisms over the mid-1970s (LM, 20).
The historical confidence of Singe holds only so 
long as it remains possible to maintain that revolt, far 
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from being a matter of rare insurrection or ephem-
eral enthusiasm, is instead a historical and ongoing 
constant.28 Lardreau’s initially uncritical identifica-
tion with the will of the masses leaves him at a 
loss once the masses veer away from their expected 
historical course, whether it be to the right (as in mid-
1970s France) or left (as in Cambodia). As the radical 
mobilization in French factories began to subside, 
after 1972, the dwindling Gauche Prolétarienne 
struggled to find a foothold in the shifting political 
terrain. In 1973, the year Singe was published, Gauche 
Prolétarienne found no answer to the conundrum 
posed by the quasi-‘liberated’ workforce at the Lip 
watch factory, once they indicated a willingness to 
work with rather than against the logic of capitalist 
exchange.29 More to the point, faced with the eventu-
ally undeniable evidence of Khmer Rouge crimes, 
Lardreau could respond only by severing the link that 
had held his early political philosophy together – the 
link between the will of the masses and the course 
of history.30 
The revelation of Cambodia’s killing fields 
marked for Lardreau, as for many of his contempo-
raries, a definitive break with the Marxian pursuit 
of political power as a means of realizing freedom 
and overcoming poverty and injustice.31 Khmer 
atrocities proved, to Lardreau, that anyone who still 
seeks to rebel against or at least limit the violence of 
mastery and oppression must first deny any actual 
autonomy of revolt, any worldly or political possibil-
ity of moving ‘beyond the history of the Master’.32 
From now on, Lardreau is prepared to accept that, 
as far as justice and morality are concerned, the only 
kingdom that matters is indeed ‘not of this world’. 
By the late 1970s, he has convinced himself that 
‘what we are living today is not simply the repeated 
failure of revolutions to fulfil their programme of 
happiness for the people … but rather the failure 
of the Idea itself of Revolution.’ What has failed, 
and failed definitively, is the very idea that ‘political 
struggle might be able to transform, in a radical 
way, people’s lives’ (LM, 13). What will be at issue 
from now on, strictly speaking, is not the relative 
successive or failure of this or that project, but the 
need for any project to retreat without reservation 
from the very dimension in which it might either 
succeed or fail; that is, to retreat from its very exist-
ence and temporality as a project tout court. In Le 
Monde, even those vanishing traces of revolutionary 
political affirmation that had persisted in L’Ange are 
now purged without trace, so as to count ‘strictly for 
nothing’ (LM, 279).
V
Once he had admitted that ‘revolution is impos-
sible’, Lardreau was left with two choices. He could 
have revised his earlier condemnation of society as 
oppressive, and simply abandoned his revolution-
ary pretensions: this would have allowed him to 
follow the majority of his contemporaries, as they 
undertook their neoliberal turn in the mid- to late 
1970s, and made their peace with individualism, 
representation and the capitalist state. Or else he 
could uphold his revolutionary ideals, in all their 
intransigent integrity, while absolving them from the 
domain of actuality; that is, by reconceiving them 
as merely negative or regulative ideals – in short, 
by retreating from Rousseau to Kant. These ideals 
could then still be affirmed without qualification, and 
without fear of criminal actualization, so long as they 
remained a matter of purely moral obligation, or of a 
spiritual redemption from actuality. Confronted with 
the world’s reality and injustice, Lardreau eventu-
ally found what he was looking for – an emphati-
cally ‘real’ point of resistance, a ‘granite’ point that 
remains forever ‘irreducible and unavoidable’ (LM, 
40; cf. LV, 149) – in Kant’s idea of transcendental or 
extra-natural freedom, freedom understood as the 
capacity to posit an unconditionally binding moral 
law, such that ‘freedom and unconditional practical 
law reciprocally imply each other’.33
Although this isn’t the place to consider the 
sequence in detail, we might chart Lardreau’s subse-
quent movement away from the ‘actuality of revolt’ 
in three overlapping moments. In L’Ange (1976), he 
still affirms the will to revolt against the evils of 
the world, while acknowledging that so long as it is 
invested in an actual emancipatory political project 
so then revolt may always be deluded, co-opted and 
harnessed to new forms of oppression. In Le Monde 
(1978), revolt withdraws from any political engage-
ment with the world at all, in order to take refuge 
in an uncompromising ‘moral attitude’, one that 
upholds our duty to respect the imprescriptible rights 
that should apply to every individual in all situations. 
In La Véracité (1993), the neo-Kantian framework for 
this moral attitude is reaffirmed but reframed along 
still more strictly ‘negative’ lines, in keeping with 
the purely ‘supersensible’ and supra-actual quality of 
our freedom to posit an unconditional moral law. If 
Singe was sustained by an ‘act of faith in the thought 
of the masses in revolt’ (SO, 89), when in due course 
this faith was tested by its contradiction in reality, 
Lardreau’s response was not to abandon his faith but 
to transfer it away from a faith in political capacity to 
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a faith in faith as such, faith as a spiritual discipline 
in search of means to minimize its dependence on 
the things and development of this world. 
What Lardreau calls ‘the modern age’ (i.e. the 
age that spans the era between the French and 
Chinese cultural revolutions) decided that it was in 
the exercise of great or revolutionary politics that 
‘the supersensible vocation of culture can and must 
become sensible’.34 Participation in the voluntarist 
projects pursued by such ‘Great Politics’ was based 
on the assumption that human fulfilment and eman-
cipation could be achieved in actuality, through col-
lective determination to overcome all resistance to 
their realization; political action thereby offered a 
demanding but feasible road, both for Rousseau and 
for Marx, Lenin and Mao, to an eventual ‘reign of 
freedom’. 
As everyone knows, most of Lardreau’s contem-
poraries who shared his youthful enthusiasm for 
this project simply abandoned any reference to our 
‘supersensible vocation’, along with any illusion that 
it could somehow transform our all-too-sensible his-
torical reality. What is distinctive about Lardreau’s 
trajectory, by comparison with the various ‘roads to 
renegacy’ followed by so many of his former com-
rades,35 is that he never abandoned his defence of 
either the rightness of revolt or of the resolve to 
pursue it. The maxim of the materialist parti du réel 
that he defends in his last publications remains: ‘ faire 
effort’ (VM, 50, 57). The real contemporary alterna-
tive to Lardreau’s rebellious engagement, from this 
perspective, is not so much to be found among the 
rival post-Maoisms of Badiou or Rancière as in the 
renewal of ‘Stoic pacifism’, spiritualist immanence 
and productivist vitalism that he associates primarily 
– and with good reason – with Deleuze.36 
However, after the excesses of the Khmer and 
cultural revolutions had persuaded him that every 
attempt ‘to bend figures of political power to the 
highest ends of reason’ can end only in ‘disastrous 
and criminal failure’,37 the chief critical target of 
Lardreau’s later philosophy becomes precisely that 
notion of an actually general will that he affirmed, 
via Rousseau and Mao, in his first book.38 The super-
sensible must be respected for what it is, as réel in 
a roughly Lacanian sense, rather than realizable.39 
At the same time, Lardreau abandons the terrain of 
collective action for that of the individual conscience, 
the work of worldly emancipation for a noumenal 
freedom, and the concrete exercise of political power 
for the pure postulation of an abstract law and 
the formal norms it entails. The task of practical 
philosophy ceases to be a matter of overcoming those 
social and political obstacles that might prevent the 
full generalization of the people’s will, the full self-
emancipation of humanity or the full realization of a 
collective freedom, so as to take refuge instead in the 
absolute transcendence of the moral law. Against any 
further temptation to think politics and philosophy 
together, for the later Lardreau the essential feature 
of any philosophy worthy of the name will become 
its ability to negate all such articulation, so as to 
preserve, in all its unending vertigo, the abyss that 
ought always to separate our moral duty from our 
political capacity. In the end,
if philosophy has nothing to say about Great 
Politics as such, this is simply because the one 
contradicts and excludes the other, and vice versa. 
… In other words: no political decision can be 
legitimately deduced from any philosophical posi-
tion, and it would seem that the converse should 
be retained as a reliable criterion: any orientation 
of thought which presumes that political decisions 
might be directly concluded from it is an orienta-
tion that is foreign to philosophy.40
The main significance of Lardreau, considered 
as a philosopher of the will, then, is itself a nega-
tive one: he demonstrates how the drive to absolve 
it from actuality evacuates the practice of volition 
itself, rendering it indistinguishable from mere wish 
or aspiration, on the one hand, and an effectively 
involuntary reflex (‘one must always revolt against 
oppression’), on the other. If we cannot frame it in 
terms of political will as such, then there is no way of 
defending an account of collective self-determination 
from those that might seek to reduce it either to pious 
aspiration or to the force of habit. 
If Lardreau deserves to be recognized as one of the 
few thinkers of his time to have taken seriously ‘the 
will to revolt’, it is because he sought to ground it in 
normative criteria drawn from revolt per se – first 
the political revolt against worldly injustice, and then 
the moral revolt against any persistence in political 
revolt. We would do better, however, to seek our 
normative criteria in the practice of free collective 
volition or self-determination itself. The alternative 
to Lardreau’s via negativa is not to persist in the 
‘Lin Biaoist madness’ that compromised its point 
of departure, but to consolidate the conjunction, in 
every sphere of its exercise, between a political will 
and the actuality of its capacities, including those 
capacities, constituted precisely through free and vol-
untary practice, to assemble, to inform, to deliberate, 
to unite, to engage and to overcome the obstacles that 
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stand in the way of its engagement.41 As Lardreau 
knew full well, at every stage of his philosophical 
itinerary, to will the end is indeed to will the means.
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